27 June 2007 :
Speech
Kosovo
6.37 pm Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con): I am grateful for the opportunity to speak on this important subject. Given the current impasse in Kosovo, tonight's debate is timely. First, however, I think it only right to put on the record our remembrance of those people across the ethnic divide in former Yugoslavia who suffered for such a long time, with many thousands losing their lives in the conflict.
The debate on Kosovo's future status has reached a crucial point. United Nations special envoy Martti Ahtisaari's final comprehensive proposal for a Kosovo status settlement still does not have universal agreement, and it is that lack of consensus which is causing the current road-block to progress. The United States, backed by the UK, although understandably eager to see a Kosovo settlement, is perhaps in danger of being a little too eager in calling for a new UN resolution to be adopted "as soon as possible". At this sensitive juncture, such a resolution might be unhelpful and awkwardly premature. It was not over-constructive of President Bush to declare in Tirana two weeks ago that "Kosovo is independent". The comments might have played well in Albania, but they did little to advance a consensus-based settlement. A unilateral declaration by the United States and the United Kingdom would also serve to undermine an already weakened United Nations.
Clearly, an early settlement to the Kosovo question is desirable to all players. Failure to make progress would set back the timetable for Kosovo’s and Serbia’s applications to become members of the European Union, and would also impact on other candidate countries in the region.
It is in the interests of Europe and the region that a settlement be agreed, but it needs to be a lasting settlement that stands the test of time—and tests will surely come. German Chancellor Merkel was right to say at the G8 summit that Europe’s leaders want a consensus-based solution, but that consensus should be based on agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, not agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States. The US and the UK should not underestimate the resolve of the Serbian people on that matter, and should not overestimate the attraction of future EU membership for Serbia. Yes, jobs are important, but long-term jobs and investment in both Kosovo and Serbia can be sustained in the long-term only if there is long-term peace.
The United States has impressive insight into and knowledge of geopolitics, but to suggest that the US has a greater knowledge of the Balkans than Kosovo’s near neighbours, such as Slovakia, Romania and Russia, is misguided. I do not wish to be unnecessarily critical of the UK Government, but once again it appears that they are falling in behind the position of the American State Department and, more importantly, the White House, rather than trying to realign the US’s position, which would be more helpful to all those involved in the process.
There is still time for the UK Government to adopt a “candid friend” approach, but time is running out. I reiterate that there are great dangers in trying to force through a plan without consensus. If consensus cannot be achieved, we should try to make progress, with fewer areas of disagreement; there is a distinction between the two. The Minister for the Middle East will know that peace—true peace that lasts—is not written on scrolls and treaties, but on the hearts and minds of peoples and populations. That brings me on to Russia. As the record suggests, I have been critical of Russia on many occasions, but on the issue of Kosovo I think that Russia is right in saying that there needs to be a negotiated solution, rather than an imposed solution. Notwithstanding that, Russia should not wittingly or unwittingly allow its view on the status settlement to be entangled by wider fears about European expansion. It is not just in Europe’s interests, but in Russia’s own strategic interest, for there to be peace in the Balkans.
What can be done to make progress? First, there should be full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244, as regards the conditions in which Kosovo’s Serbs live. Secondly, Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Mr. Çeku, needs fully to recognise how far Serbia has come, and he should not make unreasonable demands of President Tadic. He also needs to ensure that Kosovo’s expectations are managed appropriately internally. That, of course, should be done through peaceful means. Mr. Çeku’s Government need to agree on multi-ethnic symbols for the future of the Kosovo state. They should also ensure that more robust measures, and not just measures for the protection of Serbian religious sites, are put in place to protect the Serb minority.
The United States Administration should allow some modifications to the Ahtisaari plan, such as the creation of the post of special envoy for minorities, and the setting of a five-year moratorium—I am flexible about the length of the moratorium—before Kosovo can apply for UN membership. Washington, London, Berlin and Pristina need to avoid using the pretext of pro-Kosovo independence violence on the streets of Pristina to try and rush through a settlement. Such a policy could fuel further genuine and/or orchestrated violent protests in Pristina, and further such protests in response in Belgrade.
I should like to ask the Minister why the UK Government dismissed so quickly the proposal to split the Ahtisaari plan. First, we could consider ensuring that Kosovo’s Government improved the lives of the 100,000 Serbs still living in Kosovo, as I said earlier, but robust measures should be taken. Perhaps it could be implicit that after that, there would be a process leading towards statehood at a later agreed date. Perhaps the Government need to revisit that possibility. Does the Minister agree that both the letter and spirit of resolution 1244 on the protection of minority rights should remain a precondition of the status issue? Sustainable social, economic and political equilibrium is clearly needed if peace is to be maintained in the region.
I am conscious of Kosovo’s status post-settlement, and I hope that in trying to ensure a peaceful future for the Balkans—perhaps intervention through NATO should only have ever been a temporary military measure, not a long-term political intervention—the United States, the UK and their partners should ensure they do all they can to make sure that Kosovo does not become, over time, a base camp for the radicalisation of the Balkans.
Mike Penning (Hemel Hempstead) (Con): I thank my hon. Friend for his generosity in giving way. May I take him back to his comments about NATO and invite him to join me in congratulating the NATO and British troops who helped to secure the peace in Kosovo? We would not be able to discuss peace and Kosovo’s future were it not for the brave personnel in our armed forces, especially the British armed forces.
Mark Pritchard: Absolutely. My hon. Friend, as ever, makes a pertinent and well put point, and I pay tribute to all the members of Her Majesty’s armed services who served, or are serving, in the Balkans. He will know that more than 200 members of the intelligence corps and signal regiment are serving in Kosovo today, and the former Prime Minister was right to refer to that in the House today.
May I touch on common foreign policy? In his recent European Council statement to the House, former Prime Minister Blair said that it was
“important that Europe has a common foreign and security policy”.
I fundamentally disagree with the breadth of the statement. In the same reply, Mr. Blair unwittingly underlined the very reason why such a policy is unworkable. He said that
“in relation to Iran, Kosovo or how we make progress in the middle east...it should allow us to have a European position.”—[ Official Report, 25 June 2007; Vol. 462, c. 28.]
Perhaps the Minister can remind the new Prime Minister that there is no common European position on Kosovo. Slovakia, Romania and Greece all have major reservations about taking the Ahtisaari plan en bloc. If Europe cannot agree a common foreign policy position in its own backyard, how can it agree a common position on the many global challenges that will face us and unravel over the coming years and decades?
In conclusion, if the American Administration make a unilateral declaration on Kosovo’s independence, that could precipitate exactly the same action from the Assembly of Kosovo and Prime Minister Çeku. That would be a huge and dangerous step backwards, which is why a new timetable for a new settlement agreement would be helpful to everyone involved. Negotiations cannot continue in perpetuity—I accept that eight years working towards a settlement is long enough—and the limbo should end. Further clarity and reassurance are needed, not alarm and threats. There is a great deal of difference between a timetable towards a new consensus resolution and the imposition of a resolution. Yes, progress needs to be made, but it must be proportionate to the extant goodwill within the process, not disproportionate. I hope that our new Prime Minister will start his premiership by encouraging the United States to listen more and first rather than after the damage is done. Diplomatic short cuts seldom provide long-term solutions for peace, and the price of getting a Kosovo settlement wrong would be very costly indeed. 6.49 pm ... INTERVENTIONS IN THE DEBATE Mark Pritchard: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that although there is a lot of good in the Ahtisaari plan, it should be seen not as a table-d’hôte menu but as an ? la carte menu, and that we need to work around that?
Andrew Mackinlay: I wholeheartedly agree with the hon. Gentleman, and I want to come on to what I think is the way forward. I am not dismissing Ahtisaari, I am simply saying that Ahtisaari with Kosovan independence, a seat at the United Nations and an internationally recognised personality as a sovereign independent state would at this stage be foolhardy. But there is a way forward, and I notice that the hon. Gentleman pleaded with the British Government to consider splitting the Ahtisaari plan, using it as a basis for negotiations, which I wholeheartedly support. ... Mark Pritchard: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that Albania has a major role in ensuring that its dialogue with Kosovo is restrained and measured, certainly in the context of its wanting to accede to the EU? It needs to be a responsible player in the region.
Andrew Mackinlay: Yes, and Tirana is doing that. Sometimes—out of either ignorance or malevolence—some people exaggerate the desire of Albania and try to imply that there is strong irredentist movement there. That is not proven; in fact, a resolution of this matter will probably guarantee that that does not happen. Albania is on board for the kind of scenario and solution that, rather inadequately, I fear, I am outlining. Albania aspires to EU membership and has no desire to take Kosovo into its territory. ... Mark Pritchard: Does the Minister agree, however, that the alternative is perhaps to split the Ahtisaari plan into two, so that the status settlement runs alongside delivery on other key issues, such as more protection for minorities—clearly, mostly Serbs? Dr. Howells: Such a split would lose the careful balance that, we believe, runs through the Ahtisaari proposals. It would simply not work on the ground. Two thirds of the Ahtisaari proposals set out safeguards and benefits for the Kosovo Serbs. It would be difficult to convince the Kosovo Albanians to implement those elements of the proposals if the issue of status were left unresolved. ... Mark Pritchard: Is the position of the UK Government exactly the same in relation to the timing of any new UN resolution coming forward or not?
Dr. Howells: Yes. We want to see a UN resolution come forward, and we want to see it sooner rather than later. I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the dates of the Security Council deliberation on the subject, but I will try to find out for him when it might be timetabled. We are determined that the time has come for the Security Council to make this decision and we will discuss that with Russia, which is an extremely important player, for the reasons that my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock—among others—described. | 